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CITIZENSHIP, 
DIVERSITY AND 
MOBILITY 
Kees Groenendijk  
Radboud University, Nijmegen
Maarten Vink’s paper clearly illustrates how a 
new methodological approach to an old question 
can produce new insights. Vink’s longitudinal 
‘life course perspective’ and his combination of 
information from different sources allow him to go 
beyond the old debate about the causal relationship 
between naturalisation and integration resulting 
from the more limited data used in the traditional 
binary approach to this issue. His research also 
produces results that are highly relevant in the 
current political debate in several EU Member 
States. I mention two examples. His findings 
that the labour market participation of migrants 
peaks before and not after naturalisation is highly 
relevant in the debate in states where politicians 
propose extending the residence requirement for 
naturalisation. In the Netherlands, a bill is pending 
in the Senate which would extend the current five-
year residence requirement (in place since 1892) 
to seven years. In its electoral programme for the 
March 2017 parliamentary elections, the largest 
current government party (VVD) announced 
plans for a further extension to ten years. The 
justification for these proposals is that they 
would support immigrant integration. The results 
from Vink’s research illustrate that the extension 
would have negative effects on the labour market 
participation of those immigrants who are most 
interested in acquiring citizenship. Moreover, his 
paper makes it clear that five to ten years after 
their arrival considerable numbers of refugees are 
still living in the country of refuge, however much 
both they and the receiving societies would prefer 
an early return to their countries of origin.
My first question is whether by presenting 
aggregate data the author does not underestimate 
the diversity within the population researched. 
The migrant population in his data is composed 
of refugees, nationals of other EU member states, 
spouses of nationals, economic migrants and in 
some cases co-ethnics. The differences within 
and between these categories remain invisible in 
aggregate quantitative data. For instance, the data 
presented in Figure 8 of Vink’s paper result from 
widely different behaviours between refugees 
and nationals from other EU member states, 
the former category having high naturalisation 
rates and the latter generally having much lower 
rates. Vink points to the large differences in the 
perceived payoff from naturalisation between 
the different immigrant groups. However, 
within certain groups the payoffs and the actual 
naturalisation practice also vary considerably. 
In the Netherlands, the naturalisation rates of 
nationals of southern and eastern Member States 
are far higher than among EU nationals from the 
northern and the neighbouring Member States.
Second, I doubt whether naturalisation generally 
reflects a deliberate choice by the migrant 
to remain and integrate in the society of his 
country of residence. In his introduction, Vink 
presents naturalisation as “a deliberate choice by 
immigrants to link their future with that of the host 
country.” This image often dominates the political 
and public debate. It may be true for the majority 
of applicants, at least at the time of naturalisation, 
but the reality is more diverse. The paper mentions 
out-migration after naturalisation. Recent data on 
the Netherlands give a first impression of the size 
and diversity of that out-migration. In 2009-2013 
a total of 44,000 persons originating from nine 
refugee-producing countries were naturalised. 
Within two years of their naturalisation 14% of 
these new Dutch nationals left the Netherlands. 
Some returned to their countries of origin, while 
others migrated to other EU Member States. 
Within two years of their naturalisation almost 40% 
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of the naturalised former-refugees from Bosnia, 
Iran, Iraq and Sudan returned to their countries of 
origin. Among former refugees from Afghanistan, 
Sierra Leone and Somalia the return rate was 
considerably lower (below 10%). The former 
refugees, who used the right to free movement 
within the EU attached to their new nationality, 
migrated from the Netherlands primarily to the 
UK (40%), to Belgium (9%) and to Germany (7%). 
More than half of the 6,000 new Dutch nationals 
who left the Netherlands within two years moved 
to these three EU Member States.1 Naturalisation 
enhances the mobility of new nationals, both to 
their countries of origin and within the EU.
Apparently, refugees’ acquisition of the nationality 
of their country of refuge enables their return to 
the county of origin, because it reduces the risks in 
returning through the protection attached to the 
new nationality. It also grants the right to come 
back to the country of the new nationality if the 
country of origin turns out to not yet be safe or 
the prospects of successful re-integration in that 
country is not yet positive. From anthropological 
research, it appears that out-migration to other 
EU Member States may be triggered by various 
factors: better labour market chances (perceived or 
real), easier access to self-employment in the UK, 
the presence of family members, or a larger and 
stronger community of co-ethnics.2 Naturalisation 
may be a liberalisation for those asylum seekers 
who did not intend to migrate to the Netherlands 
but were trapped in the Dublin system. In these 
cases, naturalisation functions as a correction to 
that system, which almost completely disregards 
the well-founded wishes of persons seeking 
protection to go to a specific country in Europe.
These data indicate that it may be promising to 
1  Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Migatiegedrag van 
personene met een specifieke herkomst die in de periode 2006-2013 
de Nederlandse nationaliteit hebben verkregen, www.cbs.nl, visited 
27 September 2016, and B. Meindersma, Deel vluchtelingen wacht 
op paspoort en vertrekt weer snel, http://nos.nl/artikel/2134178.
2  Jill Ahrens, Melissa Kelly, Melissa and Ilse van Liempt, 
(2014) Free movement? The onward migration of EU citizens born in 
Somalia, Iran and Nigeria, Population, Space and Place. ISSN 1544-
8444.
extend the life course perspective with a focus on 
the labour market position of new nationals who 
left the country during the first few years after 
their naturalisation. Moreover, information from 
longitudinal quantitative data should be combined 
with the results of empirical research focussing on 
the migrant perspective, rather than on the state 
perspective that is implicit in the data collected by 
government bodies.
In order to explain the naturalisation patterns of 
immigrants, Vink’s paper looks both at variables 
in the country of residence and in the country 
of origin. With regard to the latter variables, the 
focus is on the political stability and the stage 
of economic development. But I would suggest 
that nationality law and practice in the country 
of origin may be another relevant variable 
explaining the inclination of immigrants to 
apply for naturalisation. In the 1970s and 1980s 
the Dutch rule requiring immigrants who could 
renounce their first nationality to do so had the 
effect that Moroccan immigrants applied for 
naturalisation because they could not renounce 
their nationality and thus were not obliged to do 
so, whilst immigrants from Turkey rarely applied 
because under the Turkish nationality law they 
could renounce that nationality and were therefore 
required to do so according to Dutch nationality 
law. The difference between the naturalisation 
practices of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants 
became even more pronounced when in special 
broadcasts directed at Moroccan immigrants 
the head of the naturalisation department of the 
Ministry of Justice explicitly stated that acquiring 
Dutch nationality did not imply that applicants 
had to abandon their religion. Only after the 
renunciation requirement was de facto abolished 
in the 1990s did large numbers of Turkish 
immigrants start to apply for naturalisation, 
causing a peak in the Dutch naturalisation statistics 
in 1996. Naturalisation practice thus often results 
from the interplay between the nationality rules of 
the two countries concerned. 
SECTION 1: CITIZENSHIP AND LEGAL STATUSES | CITIZENSHIP, DIVERSITY AND MOBILITYS ~  
Kees Groenendijk
50
In the final part of Vink’s paper it is rightly 
suggested that much research focuses on the effect 
on immigrant integration of transition towards 
citizenship and less so on other types of legal 
status transition, such as from asylum seeker to 
recognised refugee or from temporary migrant 
to migrant with permanent status. I would 
suggest that the latter status transition is the most 
promising focus for future empirical research. 
The many legal barriers to integration attached 
to the status of asylum seekers (limited access to 
the labour marker, to language courses and to 
family reunification) and their relatively short 
length of residence in the country of refuge will 
make it hard to identify the effects of granting the 
stronger status that, on paper, allows free access 
to the labour market. Empirical research on the 
transition from temporary to permanent residence 
status will offer a better possibility of identifying 
the effects of status transition on integration. 
Moreover, it will allow testing of the hypothesis 
that the transition towards citizenship “arguably 
in practice [is the] most relevant legal status 
transition.” Here, I repeat my plea for longitudinal 
quantitative research to be combined with 
qualitative research focussing on the immigrant’s 
perspective.3 When the focus of research is on 
the effects of transition from one legal status to 
another, we should not forget that a stronger legal 
status does not always result in a better social 
position. In her interesting comparative study 
of different groups of Polish immigrants in the 
Netherlands, Cathelijne Pool found that before 
Poland’s EU membership immigrants with both 
Polish and German nationalities, who due to their 
status as EU citizens had the strongest legal status, 
nevertheless in practice had a clearly less secure 
labour market and social integration position due 
to their lack of knowledge of a language that was 
understood by the majority population (English 
3  Jill Ahrens, Suspended in Eurocrisis: new immobilities 
and semi-legal migrations amongst Nigerians living in Spain, Journal 
of Mediterranean Studies (22) 2013 22, pp. 115-140. ISSN 1016-
3476.
or German)4, their reliance on family contacts 
and their dependency on private employment 
agencies.5  Legal status is only one among 
many variables influencing the integration of 
immigrants.
4  For a long time Poles with German ancestry living in 
Poland could acquire German nationality without being proficient 
in the German language.
5  Cathelijne Pool, Migration van Polen naar Nederland in 
een tijd van versoepeling van migratieregels, Nijmegen 2011 (Boom 
Juridische Uitgevers). 
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